Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks

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CONTEXT

The goal is to implement the instruction duplication technique as a countermeasure against Fault Attacks on an ARM 32-bit Microcontroller[1,2]. Operating inside a compiler allowed us to reduce the security overhead thanks to the flexibility and code transformations opportunities offered by compilers

WORKFLOW



The user identifies the portions of the program to protect

```
@__to_secure__("fault")
int foo(int a, int b){
  . . .
  return a * b + a;
}
```

C source code

The user has a full control over parts of the code to protect

Instructions cannot be duplicated at the middle-end due to the SSA form

```
entry:
  %mul = mul %a, %b
  %add = add %mul, %a
  ret %add
```

LLVM bytecode

Attempted duplication →

```
entry:
  %mul  = mul %a, %b
  %mul2 = mul %a, %b
  %add  = add %mul, %a
  %add2 = add %mul, %a
```

Unused and will be removed by the **D**ead **C**ode **E**limination pass

We only select instructions that are suitable for duplication

1



By default → **m**ul**t**iply and **a**ccumulate: `mla a, a, b` is matched ✗

destination *sources*

Instead → we separately match: a `mul` followed by `add` ✓

2 Generation of 3-address instructions:

Instead of generating `add vreg1, vreg2` ✗

We generate `add vreg3, vreg1, vreg2` ✓

Registers are allocated in favor of duplication

The register allocator tends to reduce *register pressure*: Reusing the allocated registers as soon as possible

When the liveness intervals (L) of registers are disjoint: $\{L(\texttt{vreg3})\} \cap \{L(\texttt{vreg1}) \,.\, L(\texttt{vreg2})\} = \emptyset$

```
add vreg3, vreg1, vreg2
```

By default →

```
add r0, r0, r1
```

✗

We introduce a constraint: $\$dst \neq \$src$

≠ →

```
add r0, r1, r2
```

✓

Instructions are duplicated before scheduling

```
add r0, r1, r2
str r5, [r3, #4]
```

Before duplication

Duplication →

```
add r0, r1, r2
add r0, r1, r2
str r5, [r3, #4]
str r5, [r3, #4]
```

Before scheduling

Scheduling →

```
str r5, [r3, #4]
add r0, r1, r2
str r5, [r3, #4]
add r0, r1, r2
```

After scheduling

Comparison with assembly approach

	Instruction	Transformation	Duplication

Assembly approach	`add r0, r0, r2`	`mov rx, r0`
		`add r0, rx, r2`
			`mov rx, r0`
			`mov rx, r0`
			`add r0, rx, r2`
			`add r0, rx, r2`

Our approach	`add r0, r1, r2`		`add r0, r1, r2` `add r0, r1, r2`

X 4

X 2

AES 8-bit *NIST* on ARM Cortex-M3

Unprotected	Protected	Overhead
8541 cycles	17311 cycles	× 2.03

FUTURE WORK & REFERENCES

FUTURE WORK

- Using code annotation for more flexibility when defining the code regions to protect
- Automatic identification of the most vulnerable parts of the program
- compiler-based implementation of the masking countermeasure

REFERENCES

[1] Barenghi et al. *Countermeasures against fault attacks on software implemented AES*
[2] Moro et al. *Electromagnetic Fault Injection : Towards a Fault Model on a 32-bit Microcontroller*

LEGEND

✓ Duplicable ✗ Not duplicable